Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

User Namespaces

Michael Kerrisk, man7.org © 2020

mtk@man7.org

February 2020

Outline

7 User Namespaces	7-1
7.1 Overview of user namespaces	7-3
7.2 Creating and joining a user NS	7-9
7.3 User namespaces: UID and GID mappings	7-17
7.4 User namespaces, execve(), and user ID 0	7-31
7.5 Accessing files; file-related capabilities	7-48
7.6 Security issues	7-55
7.7 Use cases	7-62
7.8 Combining user namespaces with other namespaces	7-68

Outline

7	User Namespaces	7-1
7.1	Overview of user namespaces	7-3
7.2	Creating and joining a user NS	7-9
7.3	User namespaces: UID and GID mappings	7-17
7.4	User namespaces, execve(), and user ID 0	7-31
7.5	Accessing files; file-related capabilities	7-48
7.6	Security issues	7-55
7.7	Use cases	7-62
7.8	Combining user namespaces with other namespaces	7-68

Preamble

- For even more detail than presented here, see my articles:
 - Namespaces in operation, part 5: user namespaces, https://lwn.net/Articles/532593/
 - Namespaces in operation, part 6: more on user namespaces, https://lwn.net/Articles/540087/
- There is also a *user_namespaces(7)* man page

Introduction

- Milestone release: Linux 3.8 (Feb 2013)
 - User NSs can now be created by unprivileged users...
- Allow per-namespace mappings of UIDs and GIDs
 - I.e., process's UIDs and GIDs inside NS may be different from IDs outside NS
- Interesting use case: process may have nonzero UID outside NS, and UID of 0 inside NS
 - → Process has root privileges for operations inside user NS
 - We revisit this point in a moment...

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-5 §7.1

Relationships between user namespaces

- User NSs have a hierarchical relationship:
 - A user NS can have 0 or more child user NSs
 - Each user NS has parent NS, going back to initial user NS
 - Initial user NS == sole user NS that exists at boot time
 - Maximum nesting depth for user NSs is 32
 - Parent of a user NS == user NS of process that created this user NS using clone() or unshare()
- Parental relationship determines some rules about operations that can be performed on a (child) user NS (later...)
- ioctl(fd, NS_GET_PARENT) can be used to discover parental relationship
 - Since Linux 4.9; see *ioctl_ns(2)* and http://blog.man7.org/2016/12/introspecting-namespace-relationships.html

"Root privileges inside a user NS"

- What does "root privileges in a user NS" mean?
- We've already seen that:
 - There are a number of NS types
 - Each NS type governs some global resource(s); e.g.:
 - UTS: hostname, NIS domain name
 - Mount: set of mount points
 - Network: IP routing tables, port numbers, /proc/net, ...
- What we will see is that:
 - There is an ownership relationship between user NSs and non-user NSs
 - I.e., each non-user NS is "owned" by a particular user NS
 - "root privileges in a user NS" == root privileges on (only) resources governed by non-user NSs owned by this user NS
 - And on resources associated with descendant user NSs...


Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-7 §7.1

User namespaces "govern" other namespace types



• Understanding this picture is our ultimate goal...

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

Outline

7	User Namespaces	7-1
7.1	Overview of user namespaces	7-3
7.2	Creating and joining a user NS	7-9
7.3	User namespaces: UID and GID mappings	7-17
7.4	User namespaces, execve(), and user ID 0	7-31
7.5	Accessing files; file-related capabilities	7-48
7.6	Security issues	7-55
7.7	Use cases	7-62
7.8	Combining user namespaces with other namespaces	7-68

Creating and joining a user NS

- New user NS is created with CLONE_NEWUSER flag
 - clone() ⇒ child is made a member of new user NS
 - unshare() ⇒ caller is made a member of new user NS
- Can join an existing user NS using setns()
 - Process must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in target NS
 - (The capability requirement will become clearer later)

User namespaces and capabilities

- A process gains a full set of permitted and effective capabilities in the new/target user NS when:
 - It is the child of clone() that creates a new user NS
 - It creates and joins a new user NS using unshare()
 - It joins an existing user NS using setns()
- But, process has no capabilities in parent/previous user NS
 - A Even if it was root in that NS!

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-11 §7.2

Example: namespaces/demo_userns.c

./demo_userns

- (Very) simple user NS demonstration program
- Uses clone() to create child in new user NS
- Child displays its UID, GID, and capabilities

Example: namespaces/demo_userns.c

- Use clone() to create a child in a new user NS
 - Child will execute childFunc(), with argument argv[1]
- Printing PID of child is useful for some demos...
- Wait for child to terminate

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-13 §7.2

Example: namespaces/demo userns.c

- Display PID, effective UID + GID, and capabilities
- If arg (argv[1]) was NULL, break out of loop
- Otherwise, redisplay IDs and capabilities every 5 seconds

Example: namespaces/demo_userns.c

```
$ id -u  # Display effective UID of shell process
1000
$ id -g  # Display effective GID of shell process
1000
$ ./demo_userns
eUID = 65534; eGID = 65534; capabilities: =ep
```

Upon running the program, we'll see something like the above

- Program was run from unprivileged user account
- ep means child process has a full set of permitted and effective capabilities
 - If *libcap* is not aware of all capability numbers supported by kernel, displayed capability sets may be more verbose

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-15 §7.2

Example: namespaces/demo_userns.c

```
$ id -u  # Display effective UID of shell process
1000
$ id -g  # Display effective GID of shell process
1000
$ ./demo_userns
eUID = 65534; eGID = 65534; capabilities: =ep
```

Displayed UID and GID are "strange"

- System calls such as *geteuid()* and *getegid()* always return credentials as they appear inside user NS where caller resides
- But, no mapping has yet been defined to map IDs outside user NS to IDs inside NS
- ⇒ when a UID is unmapped, system calls return value in /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid (default value: 65534)
 - ullet Unmapped GIDs \Rightarrow /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid

Outline

7	User Namespaces	7-1
7.1	Overview of user namespaces	7-3
7.2	Creating and joining a user NS	7-9
7.3	User namespaces: UID and GID mappings	7-17
7.4	User namespaces, execve(), and user ID 0	7-31
7.5	Accessing files; file-related capabilities	7-48
7.6	Security issues	7-55
7.7	Use cases	7-62
7.8	Combining user namespaces with other namespaces	7-68

UID and GID mappings

- One of first steps after creating a user NS is to define UID and GID mapping for NS
- Mappings for a user NS are defined by writing to 2 files: /proc/PID/uid_map and /proc/PID/gid_map
 - Each process in user NS has these files; writing to files of any process in the user NS suffices
 - Initially, these files are empty

UID and GID mappings

Records written to/read from uid_map and gid_map have this form:

ID-inside-ns ID-outside-ns length

- *ID-inside-ns* and *length* define range of IDs inside user NS that are to be mapped
- ID-outside-ns defines start of corresponding mapped range in "outside" user NS
- E.g., following says that IDs 0...9 inside user NS map to IDs 1000...1009 in outside user NS

0 1000 10

• 1 To properly understand ID-outside-ns, we must first look at a picture


Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-19 §7.3

Understanding UID and GID maps



- "What does ID X in namespace Y map to in namespace Z?" means "what is the equivalent ID (if any) in namespace Z?"
- What do IDs 0 and 5 in NS 1 map to in each of the other NSs?
- What does ID 15 in NS 3 map to in each of the other NSs?
- What does ID 64 in NS 2 map to in NS 3?

Interpretation of *ID-outside-ns*

- ♠ Interpretation of ID-outside-ns depends on whether process opening uid_map/gid_map is in same NS as PID
 - NB: contents of uid_map/gid_map are generated on the fly by the kernel, and can be different in different processes
- If "opener" and *PID* are in **same user NS**:
 - ID-outside-ns interpreted as ID in parent user NS of PID
 - Common case: process is writing its own mapping file
- If "opener" and *PID* are in **different user NSs**:
 - ID-outside-ns interpreted as ID in opener's user NS
 - Equivalent to previous case, if "opener" is (parent) process that created user NS using clone()
- (Above rules make sense, when we consider how these two cases could be rationally conceived)

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-21 §7.3

Quiz: reading /proc/PID/uid map

Child user NS uid_map: 200 1000 1 Contains PID 2366 Child user NS uid_map: 0 1000 1 Contains PID 2571

- If PID 2366 reads /proc/2571/uid_map, what should it see?
 - 0 200 1
- If PID 2571 reads /proc/2366/uid_map, what should it see?
 - 200 0 1

Example: updating a mapping file

Let's run demo_userns with an argument, so it loops:

```
$ id -u  # Display user ID of shell
1000
$ id -G  # Display group IDs of shell
1000 10
$ ./demo_userns x
PID of child: 2810
eUID = 65534; eGID = 65534; capabilities: =ep
```

• Then we switch to another terminal window (i.e., a shell process in parent user NS), and write a UID mapping:

```
echo '0 1000 1' > /proc/2810/uid_map
```

Returning to window where we ran demo_userns, we see:

```
eUID = 0; eGID = 65534; capabilities: =ep
```

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-23 §7.3

Example: updating a mapping file

 But, if we go back to second terminal window, to create a GID mapping, we encounter a problem:

```
$ echo '0 1000 1' > /proc/2810/gid_map
bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
```

- There are (many) rules governing updates to mapping files
 - Inside the new user NS, user is getting full capabilities
 - It is critical that capabilities can't leak
 - I.e., user must not get more permissions than they would otherwise have **outside the namespace**

Validity requirements for updating mapping files

If any of these rules are violated, write() fails with EINVAL:

- There is a limit on the number of lines that may be written
 - Linux 4.14 and earlier: between 1 and 5 lines
 - An arbitrarily chosen limit that was expected to suffice
 - 5 * 12-byte records: small enough to fit in a 64B cache line
 - Since Linux 4.15: between 1 and 340 lines
 - The limit of 5 was in a few cases becoming a hindrance
 - 340 * 12-byte records: can fit in 4KiB
- Each line contains 3 valid numbers, with length > 0, and a newline terminator
- The ID ranges specified by the lines may not overlap

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-25 §7.3

Permission rules for updating mapping files

Violation of any of these "permission" rules when updating uid_map and gid_map files results in EPERM:

- Each map may be updated only once
- Writer must be in target user NS or in parent user NS
- The mapped IDs must have a mapping in parent user NS
- Writer must have following capability in target user NS
 - CAP_SETUID for uid_map
 - CAP_SETGID for gid_map

Permission rules for updating mapping files

As well as preceding rules, one of the following also applies:

- **Either**: writer has CAP_SETUID (for uid_map) or CAP_SETGID (for gid_map) capability in **parent** user NS:
 - ⇒ no further restrictions apply (more than one line may be written, and arbitrary UIDs/GIDs may be mapped)
- Or: otherwise, all of the following restrictions apply:
 - Only a single line may be written to uid_map (gid_map)
 - That line maps only the writer's eUID (eGID)
 - Usual case: we are writing a mapping for eUID/eGID of process that created the NS
 - eUID of writer must match eUID of creator of NS
 - (eUID restriction also applies for gid_map)
 - For gid_map only: corresponding /proc/PID/setgroups file must have been previously updated with string "deny"
 - We revisit reasons later

Linux Capabilities and Namespaces

©2020, Michael Kerrisk

User Namespaces

7-27 §7.3

Example: updating a mapping file

Going back to our earlier example:

- After writing "deny" to /proc/PID/setgroups file, we can update gid_map
- Upon returning to window running demo userns, we see:

```
eUID = 0; eGID = 0; capabilities: =ep
```